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viduality, or whatever.
f'or example, the
very idea of an envirorunental ethic, which
serves to protect uninhabited envirorunents

which remains shallow, heavily exploitative,
and likely disastrous, not only for many
other species but for many hwnans as well-
but uneasy also with main deeper enviromnen
tal approaches, rrost of which now emanate
from North America.
Elsewhere I have, to my
cost, taken issue with Deep Ecology, a rrove
ment with European origins quickly captured
in california, but here I wish to criticize
fonns of Moral Extensionism that now have a
main base in the southern U.S.A., fonns that
elaborate rroral standing, considerability,
and rights theories.
Again the criticism
will not be purely negative~ positive alter
native positions will begin to emerge in
early rrorning outline.

and to justify requisite respect for natural
systems and communities, founders on the
rroral rights position propounded by Regan in
defence of certain animals.

Morality is a many purpose weapon, often
deployed by pressure and interest groups.
Throughout rrodern history it has typically
been used to ground and justify a wide range
of activity and practices hostile to natural
environments. Hwnans are entitled to this or
that; their needs generate these or those
requirements, which ought to be met even
though there are costs to local envirorunents,
and so forth.
Those opposed to rrorality-

M::lral extensionisms extend rrorality and
conventional chauvinistic rroral
apparatus
beyond its conventional (but certainly unwar
ranted) confines to certain subjects and
areas where it has not been applied, or blse,
rrore likely, has been used for discrimination
and other negative purposes.
They simply
extend the rroral apparatus without much in
the way of adjustment, with egalitarian as
sumptions (equal value, equal rights, equal
consideration, etc.) applied to a wider class
of "rroral" subjects. Moral extensionism is a
typical and useful weapon of liberation and
rights rrovements (though such rrovements could
proceed with rrore accurate but less publicly
impressive equipment. As seen by a. conserva
tive opposition, rroral extensionisms endeavor
to bend morality to certain illegitimate
purposes, since not only do the extensions
make
nonsense
of the notions
involved
(rights,
equality,
standing,
interests,
etc.), but in any case everything is suffi
ciently in order, at least on the boundaries,
as it isl
Seen from a wider environmental
perspective, extensionisms are not always
unjustified in where they go but in how they
go, in the pseudo-egalitarian facades of the
extensions, and rrore important in where they
stop. For though privilege is widened and so
diluted, it remains. The zones of extension

there is a long and distinguished philosophi
cal chain from Lao-tsu through Hinckfuss and
Pigden--have a point when it comes to such
rrorality. The damage of rroralities and rroral
viewpoints often seems substantially higher
than the benefits conferred. That is because
the restrictions they impose are heavy, and
often work the wrong ways. A sort of cost/
benefit assessment of rrorality thus gets
under way, supposedly yielding negative re
sults.
Many are the arguments for morality,
beginning with the claim that it is impossi
ble to conduct oneself and one I s life without
lapsing into moral talk, concepts, practices,
and, generalizing, back into rrorality. Part
of the response to such faulty arguments is
always that there are distinctions, insisted
upon by leading rroral theorists themselves,
between value matters and rrorality.
And
there is a further distinction, tougher to
maintain, between practical deontic expres
sions (practical and expedient oughts and
should, for instance) and rroral o~ With
such devices,. anti--moralists, who do have a
solid case against objective or absolute
rroralities, can escape rroral hooks.

remain too limited, and things outside the
usual extensions, such as forests, species,
ecosystems, continue to be open to substan
tial mistreatment, exploitation, and so on.
Nor can the sorts of things involved plausib
ly be brought within the extension fold
(though isolated efforts are not lacking),
for they appear to lack requisite character
istics on which extensions operate, such as
sentience, pain receptivity, interests, indi
BF:IWEEN THE SPEX.::IES

Making rrorality work the right ways,
where it does figure seriously, is uncomfor
tably like making weapons work for peace
(rrorality being a main force behind wars and
preparation for wars) , rrore like than it
ought to be.
Nor is it nearly as easy as it
was:
beating swords into ploughshares, to
provide an assault on the environment instead
of other creatures, was a pretty easy techno-
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ments. For, in the first place, there can be
and indeed appear to be ethics which count as
environmental ones which do not include a
notion of moral standing (e.g., Naessls deep
ecology, Rodman I S ecological sensibility) •
Second, elaborations of these theories can
make warranted claims to adequacy, without
introducing and perhaps explicitly rejecting
(for the sorts of reasons given below) a
notion of moral standing.

logical feat compared with converting an Fl
11 fighter-bomber or a rrodern submarine to
peaceful purposes (genuinely peaceful ones,
that is; of course, like guns in the west,
they I re peacemakers).
For local chauvinism,
in one form of another (hmnan, or more like
ly, national, state, or race), is now deeply
entrenched in most bureaucratic arrangements
and an integral part of supporting social
sciences and technology.
Even so, whatever
local practices, moral theory can be recti
fied; the theorizing can be accomplished,
even if a new morality is not spccessfully
applied, and must await its post-Armeggedon
day.
Thus the protracted battle to duly ex
pand morality goes on.

An initial tactical point against tne
notion of moral standing concerns its origin,
on the rrodel of legal standing. Legal stand
ing is a dubious rrodel for any sufficiently
comprehensive notion of sometimes entering
into moral consideration (which can be true
of almost anything).
For one reason, it
imports some decidedly restrictive assump
tions concerning interests and rights of
whatever has such standing.
But many things
of value which enter into ethical assessment
on occasions do not have and are not the
sorts of things that can significantly have
interests or hold rights.
Legal standing
always operates in terms of having certain
sorts of interests which can be represented,
whereas what has or deserves environmental
standing may not have interests or be the
sort of thing that could have interests even
as derived (as in the case of legal persons,
such as companies) from those of its members.
More often indeed, to have legal standing is
to have certain rights, duties, protection,
etc., beginning with the right of being able
to proceed to the courts.

There are two main battle-lines over
which ideological wars (quaint to anti-moral
ists) are fought as regards moral extension
issues, lines purportedly marking moral outer
bounds.
Tlie first line concerns the follow
ing cluster of (often equated) notions: mor
al status, standing, consideration, rele
vance, considerability, etc. The second line
concentrates on a narrower group:
moral
permissions, rights, etc. These lines will
be surveyed in turn.

Against moral standing and
simplistic moral typologies
The notion of moral standing, introduced
by questionable analogy with the Anglo-Amer.f.
can notion of legal standing, is corning to
play a major but damaging role in environmen
tal ethics.
It is damaging because, very
brieflY, it would paint a heavy, but rather
arbitrary, black/white boundary--segregating
off those that have not fran those that have
moral
standing--across much more complex
territory.

Of course, there is considerable room to
widen the notion of legal standing (which can
even exclude envirorunental organizations) and
to admit,
through representation,
other
"claimants" to the courts.
Presently, the
rrodel is much too narrow, restricting access
to certain capitalist persons and claimants.
But there are severe conceptual difficulties
in the way of broadening the notion of stand
ing to encompass many requisite environmental
objects, because again of the limitations the
notions of interests and rights impose.
Or
ganizations of persons, such as partnerships,
coalitions, and so on, do not exceed (easy
stretching at most of) these limits, since
interests and rights accrue fran component
members:
uninhabited ecosystems, natural
IlDnuments, and the like do exceed those lim
its, c'Onsiderably.
Only by a brazen and
implausible overriding of these conceptual
limitations (such as Stone is prepared to
fancy American courts indulging in) can the

As to its role, it is sometimes claimed
that adoption and defense of a criterion of
moral standing is "absolutely basic" in envi
ronmental thinking and problem solving, "rea
sonably addressing" the issue of moral stand
ing "must be viewed as a benchmark of any
plausible lenvironmental ethic. I"
None of
this is so evident, especially given the
murkiness of the notion of moral standing.
In the same vein, it is stated that "a neces
sary condition for an adequate ethical theory
is the most [!] defensible criterion of moral
standing" [1]

Such

statements

are surely

overstate
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or with sociopsychological distinctions
(such as linguistic capacity or canpetence or
potential personhood).
dam)

in-built severe internal restrictions of the
legal model be overcome.
still, the inadequacies of its legal
analogy could be recognized, the analogy left
behind, and a fresh unimpeded account of the
now
rather free-floating notion offered.
VanDeVeer and Pierce are rash enough to propose an explication of !lOral standing which
can be construed along these lines.
According to them, "For any thing x, X has !lOral
standing i f and only i f the continued existence of X or its interests in well-being
have positive !lOral weight. "[2]
Actually,
they ~ that they're stipulating this, but
they're not free simply to stipulate, given
that it is a notion with some currency already, something they recognize in proceeding at
once to consider various standard answers to
their "basic question, Which things have
!lOral standing?"
The account proposed is
!lOre than a little curious, not to say obscure and scarcely grammatical.
Later, they
in effect substitute a less tortuous account,
namely: "X has !lOral standing i f and only i f
the (continued) existence or welfare of X has
positive m:>ral weight."[3] Either way, the
account is circular, since having positive
!lOral weight and having !lOral standing are
interdependent notions. In fact, some of the
problems with the account could have been
avoided by cutting out the troublesome middle
part and !lOving on to the following simpler,
explicitly circular account:
X has !lOral
standing i f and only i f X possesses (or obtains) positive noral weight. But then as an
explication the definition might almost as
well drop outr it explicates nothing,
necting some near synonyms only.

Despi te the enthusiasm shown for the
notion of !lOral standing, then, no satisfactory criterion for !lOral standing emerges or
is in clear sight.
It remains to be derronstrated that there is a stable, non-arbitrary
context-invariant notion of !lOral standing
worth pursuing.
The reason for the enthusiasm about this difficult notion that does no
present useful work is evident enough:
it
would decisively delimit the !lOral search
space, what needs to be looked at in !lOral
conflict issues,
utilitarian cost/benefit
assessments, applications and delimitations
of categorical imperatives (which presuppose
a !lOral universe, usually of persons), and so
forth.
There are as well !lOre sinister ulterior purposes behind some proposed applications of the notion, for instance use of the
distinction
to reduce the search
space
towards the confines of the humanistic/chauvinistic fold (partly this is achieved by use
of the tenn "!lOral").
Moral standing is not
a m:>rally nelitral notion but a framework and
culturally dependent one, hence some of its
limitations.
Consider instead of work, instead of
straightforward pragmatics, what !lOral standing is supposed to confer or~.
I t is
assumed that if X has !lOral standing, then
!lOral agents have presumptive obligations and
duties to x, e.g., to let it alone, not to
confine it or undermine its interests.
Or,
to put it the other way around, i f a thing
has m:>ral standing, it is entitled to continued existence, pursuit of its interests,
whereas i f it lacks !lOral standing, it does
not have this protection, it does not count,
instead there is entitlement to interfere
with it.
Indeed, so it is said, "By definition of !lOral standing, if something lacks
m:>ral standing, its well-being just does not
itself !lOrally count. [4]
The definition,
however, delivers no such rJsult; further
implausible assumptions (reduction of weight
to well-being, equality conditions for counting) from an underlying picture of !lOral
assessment are implicitly incorporated (a
utilitarian picture where items without !lOral
standing are discounted and trade-offs of
items with !lOral standing are soon contemplated).

con-

Perhaps it is better to ask:
What work
does the notion do?
The trouble is that
except on particular theories which legislate
as to what has !lOral standing, the notion in
fact does very little work in envirorunental
ethics because there is little agreement
about what determines it. It is one of those
notions whose main home base lies within the
confines of traditional chauvinistic ethics,
which does not extend or travel well to the
wider environmental setting.
All the main
criteria proposed for !lOral standing are
unsatisfactory, they are not only unstable
and rather arbitrary but tend to confuse
ethical classifications with biological classifications (such as membership in the species HOlOO sapiens or in the zoological kingBEI'WEEN THE SPECIES

Such
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application accordingly implies an

unfortunate all-or-nothing division: if an
item is in,it gets (careful) consideration,
otherwise it gets nothing--exactly what the
legal analogy implies, a proper hearing if
standing and otherwise nothing.
What this
black/white division should be contrasted
with is not removal of all distinctions but
rather a more sophisticated ethical typology
based on a listing of ethically relevant
features and capacities, such as having value, well-being, preferences, autonany, and so
forth, and appropriate ethical postulates and
principles that are- geared to these.

Much of the importance ascribed to noral
standing or moral consideration comes frcm
conflating it with value consideration, which
is in turn equated with having sane (nonnegligible) value, bearing value that would
be taken into account, and perhaps counted,
in any ccmplete value assessment.
Though
moral attributes are evidently a subclass of
value attributes, the conflation is COlmOOIlplace.
Possessing intrinsic or inherent
value is even offered sanetimes as an alternative to moral status, but more often the
confusion is less blatant.
Indeed, People,
Penguins, and Plastic Trees,which begins by
warning us about slipperiness, soon slides
itself frcm noral standing to intrinsic value
and before long has identified the noral
standing of things with their being "valuable
in themselves." However, these notions have
different connotations.
For example, being
morally considerable suggests scme suitable
noral dimension, some weight to be taken into
account, not merely sane relevance.
Consideration also characteristically
requires
that the item in question has interests or at
least a well-being or such like (a telos)
that an agent can be considerate towards.
A
different notion would not impose these limitations; e.g., those of awe, respect, etc.,
do not. Nor,· it would appear, does moral
relevance, yet another different notion sometimes equated with moral standing, though
prestmlably erroneously, since mere artifacts
are morally relevant on occasions (for similar reasons, moral significance differs frcm
standing) •
Moral relevance remains an elusive, context-dependent quarry that .has evaded contemporary moral philosophers of high
standing, despite much effort put into the
chase.
Since how'ever, these other notions
are not going to be put to serious work--rrost
of them are, like noral standing, better
nothballed or scrapped--we can quietly bypass
the nuances and differences.

That the all-or-nothing character of
moral standing needs to be at least modified
becanes evident from various distinctions
soon introduced to keep it afloat, e.g.,
duties to (direct duties) as opposed to duties regarding (indirect and perhaps derivative duties).
The main strategy adopted in
People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees to save
the all-or-nothing context-independent boundary consists in appeal to the speciallyadjusted notion of presumptive duties. Moral
standing is assumed to be necessary and sufficient for presumptive duties; specifically,
moral agents "have a presumptive duty to X
[to treat it morally decently] if and only if
X has moral standing. But presumptive duties
are even more prone to be upset by overriding
circumstances than the older prima facie

Certainly, moral consideration and value interconnect, with value the wider notion
and morality, if not derivative, at least
dependent.
A nost important way in which
they connect is through limitations on interference. Morality precludes the gross reduction of value.
A little more precisely, a
noral actor is not nonnally entitled to interfere deliberately in such a way as to
reduce significantly overall value (or risk
the possibility of such reduction).
But
exact fornmlation of such noninterference
principles is a sensitive .matter--mainly
because deontic principles do not exclude

duties (which the notion expands) ; so the
notion operates even more as a theory-saving
device.
But even as so hedged around and so
extended (by derivative duties, duties regarding things without moral standing) , the
connections forged are IlDlch too simple, as
will appear. First, a more complex classification of things is required for moral purpose~ than a hard division into moral countabIes and others, a nonarbitrary classification such as the above typology.
Second,
rights and duties, which the notion of moral
standing is supposed to bound, link rather
with value, and extent of value.
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rendered equivalent through a camtOI1 middle
term, such as having interests, being capable
of being represented, being able to benefit.
For example, an item has rroral standing (or
deserves noral consideration) i f and only i f
it has (or can have) interests, i.e., if and
only if it has (or can have) rights. If such
faulty equations did hold, what has been said
against rroral standing would apply
also
against rights.
But they do not, and rights
require rrore independent investigation.

some reduction of value, provided it is sufficiently limited--a matter to which we shall
be obliged to retmn.
By contrast with noral considerability,
standing, and the like, value notions are
fundamental, and not at all easily avoided,
even by anti-moralists, in the regions of
envirorunental ethics.
Some of the analog
notions are trivial, however,. e.g., a thing
warrants value consideration if and only i f
it has value.
Even so, the analog notions
help in shifting the issues and showing wher:e
the real problem lies with the group of rroral
notions, namely in what makes something !!!?!::
ale It is this notion, too, that has induced
the unwarranted narrowing of focus to chauvinistic concerns. For a cormnonplace answer,
certainly wrong, to what determines what is
noral is:
human concerns.
Rather, what is
rroral has to do with interest-independent
value and with a certain impartiality and
lack of discriminations (i.e., in rrore oldfashioned fonns, with justice and goodness),
features reflected formally in suitable universalizability of principle. [5]
So conceived, rroral matters do not tenninate at
certain narrower ethical types, which exclude
the wider envirorunent.
The width of concern
would be better revealed by replacing "rroral"
by its original equivalent "ethical"
(for
comparison, consider the effect in environmental ethics of a reclassification as "environmental rrorals" or "environmental rrorality").

The chief targets for criticism will be
certain unduly narrow theories of rights,
which would have, i f they stood, decidedly
unfavorable environmental consequences.
Although Regan's particular view, for which he
has illegitimately bagged the title "the
rights view" (as if an animal rights supporter had to adopt his sort of view), is very
far fram the worst of these theories, it is
worth singling out for special attention,
since it has been heavily prcmoted in envirorunental ethics literature and it does score
exceedingly well, campared with its usual
chauvinistic rivals, in certain areas of
major enviromnental concern, such as the
(mis-)treat.ment of animals.
A theory of rights e<nprises a package
containing the following components:
a definition of a right, and further postulates
(perhaps independently argued for) delimiting
rights.
There is a good deal of slippage
between these two.
But because of the rrore

ordinary
usage controls on philosophical
theories, only so much in the way of postulates can be pumped into the definitions
offered. The package also cormnonly includes,
as well: a set of canonical fonns into which
all (nondiscarded) rights locutions or cases
can be put, and perhaps also (with ground
prepared through these canonical fonns) a set
of reduction schemes for eliminating rights
locutions, e.g., by translation, reduction
rules, etc.

Against envi romentally-restrictive
rights packages
Ethical standing does not strictly get
or grant a thing rights.
Standing gets an
item .in an ethical door for a hearing; it may
or may not be conceded or granted rights in
the hearing. Rights imply some standing, but
not vice ~ ; some standing is even, if you
like, a proper part of a right.
While such
an equation is not much excuse for identifying standing and rights, still too often the
differences are glossed over:
having rroral
rights is equated with having rroral standing.
Underneath these equations and conventions
lie important assumptions; not just the rrore
trivial one that what has a status thereby
has a right, for instance to get in the
ethical door, but the assumption that having
rights and standing or consideration are

BEI'WEEN THE SPECIES

The particular theory of rights advocated by Reqan conveniently lends itself to
separation into these components.
It begins
with a neat definition of right drawn fram
Mill, according to which a right is, roughly,
a valid (or sufficient) claim which society
should guarantee.
This is coupled with a
series of principles or postulates, each
given sane independent support, of which the
rrost basic is the right of rroral agents and

168

upon it; a stronger rope is needed for such
acts than claim can supply. '!he crucial act,
which tries to read anticipated features of
the notion of right into that of claim, fails
at the outset: "To make a claim is to assert
that saneone is entitled to treatment of a
certain kind and that the treatment is due or
owed directly to the individual in question.
To make a claim thus involves both claims-to
and claims-against individuals." [8] SUch an
analysis of making a claim impJrts much that
the ordinary notion does not support, namely
in the first place, that it involves or asserts entitlement, entitlement to treatment
of a certain sort, second, that it is a
transaction between individuals, third, that
the imputed treatment is owed directly to the
claimant or is a claim-against given individuals. But in making such claims as that one
has visited Mount Athas, has seen the lark
ascend, took tea at sunset, one is not doing
any of those things in any straightfoz:waxd
sense.
There is nothing significant due or
owed. the assertions need not be directed at
other individuals in the demanding way, or at
all; and no entitlement to special treatment
is asked for. Claim is a transitive verb, so
it requires as well as subjects, claimants,
objects, claims, propositional items typically introduced by "that" or "to." Someone who
makes a claim claims that sanething or to

patients to respectful treatment.
Although
canonical fonns are not explicitly addressed,
one does emerge, which takes the fonn "'!he
right of X[s] [not] to -," where "to" introduces an infinitival clause indicating a type
of action or activity.
'!he basic form is
. singular, applying to individuals, who are
the only rights-holders on the theory, but it
permits pluralization (the features included
distributing back onto individuals).
Finally, reduction of rights, in particular to
sane sort of utilitarian analysis, is strongly resisted.
While Regan I s rights package will be
criticized, and in significant respects rejected, through its variation a different
rights theory will emerge.
sane of the crucial principles Regan arrives at depend heavily upon--though they do ~ follow fran-t:he
definition of right(s) he defends. And several of the unnecessarily restrictive features
of the view do flow fran elaboration of this
definition, in particular the limitation of
rights to certain individual things, to certain animals.
It is impJrtant then to begin
with, and hard to avoid, the issue of definition.
To ground the variant definition and
theory of rights to be reached here firmly in
usage, consider first the main relevant sense
of right (to) given by the oxford English

(have or have dane) sanething.
But that is
all.
O1ly ~ claims are directed against
others, only ~ claims are entitlements.
And if it is claims that are entitlements
that are to be distinguished, it would be
better to start with entitlements.

Dictionary, viz., "II.7 Justifiable claims,
on legal or moral grounds, to have or obtain
sane thing, or to act in a certain way." The
account of rights .given by Mill (which Regan
claims to endorse) contains a similar core:
"a personls right is a valid claim upon society to protect him in the possession of something society ought to defend. [6] Mill pr0vides, however, an impJrtant insurance or
cover clause, as to who is supposed to cover
the claim, which the OED account does I not
include, and which Regan after a brief discussion also correctly anits. [7]
That is,
right quickly contracts to the less than
adequate valid claim, but the force of Mill I s
insurance cover is supposed to follow, primarily in virtue of what is pushed into the
idea of a claim.
As it turns out, it does
follow, but not in that way.

Just such a fresh start will be made, in
the first stage of modification of the OED
definitions and integratiOn of it with Mill I s
definition. Upon separating off legal rights
(which Regan correctly distinguishes in pretty much the standard way), the following then
results:
Rights are valid entitlements, on
moral grounds, to sanething (of a correct
category) •
The changes (fran II. 7) deserve
sane justification.
First, the phrase "(To)
have or obtain sanething, or to act in a
certain way," which gives the characteristic
fill to "(to) sanething," logically adds
little content.
For each of the sorts of
entitlement is an entitlement to sanething,
and conversely an entitlement to sanething
entails an entitlement to have scmething.
Second, "justifiable" is not strong enough; a
claimed entitlement may be regarded as justi-

Regan, now imitating Feinbergls tricks,
tries to pull substantive features of rights
out of the notion of a claim. But the notion
does not bear the weight they try to impJse
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tion) and avoid the disappearance of the
basic definition into vacuity.
A suitable
term is "titlement:" a titlement is a putative or alleged entitlement, which may or may
not be correctly validated. A titlement is a
transformation of a suitable deontic principIe, called a sustaining principle.
For
instance, the form "It is mostly permissible
[for xl to A," where suitable, yields the
titlement form "There is a titlement [for Xl
to A." Requirements for suitability, what
conditions objects (A's) and subjects (X's)
should satisfy, are investigated in what
follows.

fiable if sane sort of justification, which
as it turns out is not fully adequate, can be
given, whereas for a right the derivation
fran moral grounds has to be entirely sufficient, i.e., valid.
Third and most important, "entitlement" improves upon "claim,"
not merely for the reasons given, that the
claims involved are in any case entitling
ones, and that "entitlement" sheds dubious
claims-against preconceptions, but also because "claim" unduly and without warrant
appears to restrict the expected class of
rights havers or holders, what can have or
hold rights, to claimants.
Of course, the
haver of a right need not claim it, but it is

Before

hard to escape the assumption that if sanething has a claim then it should be the sort
of thing that can (at least potentially?)
make or stake claims.
Thus, use of the term
"claim" makes it an even tougher uphill
struggle to work the powerful rights medicine
on behalf of wild animals and wildernesses.
Of course too, what claims are made could be
made indirectly, through representatives, but
the term "representatives" suggests
very
easily that rights havers have interests to
be represented.
Opportunity to make the
dubious inference fran "rights" to "interests" should not be afforded by the basic

definition

titlements, fran correct moral principles, to
sane (categorically appropriate) item.

definition, and "entitlement" gives appropriate distance.

NcM, X has a right to A i f and only if X
has a valid titlement, fran correct moral
principles, to A, scmething that a suitable
relativized derivation may establish.
The
candidates to fill out A provide a familiar
list, e.g., freedan fran unnecessary suffering, respectful treatment, satisfying basic
needs, life, rewarding work, a fair go, etc.
By no means all of these candidates can be
validated without at least considerable qualification, and several restrict the category
of subjects, i.e., the logical sort of item
that can have the purported titlement.

A lot hangs on choice of basic terms
then, even if it seems to newo:mers, as it
does to dictionaries, that "right," "entitlement, " and "claim" are more or less interchangeable (each is characterized in standard
dictionaries partly in terms of the others)
and that definitions like the last one given
above are virtually tautologous.
Well, satisfactory explicative definitions are analytic, but preferably not trivially circular,
else informativeness is sacrificed.
A weakness of the entitlement account is that it
risks the latter. What is needed in place of
"entitlement" is something, a putative entitlement, that becanes an entitlement, or
right, when validity is appropriately established, and so on. Fran this angle, "claim"
is a slightly better expression, since a
claim sanetimes aIOClunts to "a real or supposed right," i.e., it doesn't write in validity. To avoid these problems with available
terminology, there is a case for coining a
rather imnediate expression to fill in that
something. (after "valid" in the above definiBElWEEN THE SPECIES

trying for a further

of right (to), let us return to Mill, as
interpretM by Regan.
Mill "provides guidance" as to how titlements are to be validated:
"the· validity of a right, he believes,
must depend on its canpliance with moral
principles whose validity has been independently established,"[9l i.e., correct principles.
It is the derivation fran these correct moral principles that takes up, rerroving
the slack, the vaguer "moral grounds." With
this in mind, we can frame our new definition
of right (to) as follows:
Rights are valid

SUch a scheme both enables further features of rights to be derived and reveals
much about rights.
In the first place, it
shows that Mill's important addition to the
definition of "right" of a requirement that
society ought to protect holders can be separated as a consequence, it is not (as dictionary definitions also indicate) a defining
feature.
For it is no doubt true as regards
correct moral principles that relevant societies ought to uphold them.
But such factors
as obligation to uphold, transmit over valid
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character, rights are dispensible after a
fashion and at sane cost.
So they are not
absolutely essential for environmental ethical enterprises.
But in a strongly individualistic rights-oriented society, such as
the U.S.A., where rights notions (and particularly individual property notions) are taken
very seriously, it is a smart strategy to
nake heavy use of them, after the!OOde of
Regan.
Environmental positions can do this
also by deriving appropriate tiUements.

derivations, and therefore apply to tiUements.
A characteristic point of rights, to
insure protection, is thus a consequential
feature. Similarly, such diffuse correlative
duties as societies' obligations to uJ;hold
rights are not part of the definition of
rights but a logically emergent feature from
their derivative character.
In particular,
the Feinberg-Regan claim-against canponent of
their proposed analysis is not part of the
meaning of right but sanething that follows
from the principles sustaining a right to
sanething.
For instance, if it is generally
pennissible to live free from unnecessary
suffering, then others, I1Dral agents, are
thereby prOOibited from causing unnecessary
suffering1 and the prohibition factor is
transmitted down the derivation.
A claimagainst certain, typically unspecified, I1Dral
agents is also a consequential feature of
~MtiU~tsto, transmitted from the
sustaining I1Dral principle.

Rights are not merely derivative, because, for instance, of the force they are
accorded and the roles they can play when
admitted. As American writers stress, rights
are a:aong the weightiest of m::>ral ccnsiderations, which tnnnp others (hence the impor-

Second, this scheme and definition nake
it evident that there are no self-evident or
purely axiaoatic rights:
any right that
stands up, that COlll'llaIlds the tiUe, has a
valid derivation.
And there is always a
defense of rights by reference to such derivations.
It follows, then, that any theory
that lays claims to self-evident rights or
axiaoatic rights and any declarations, ccnstitutions, or bills of rights that annOWlce
self-evident rights are mistaken. Rights are
always derivative fran other parts of an
ethical system.
'lhird, the theory shows directly the
"derivative character" ~f rights and helps to
indicate the extent of their eliminability.
For if rights are ever to be established,
then there ImlSt, in the end, be correct I1Dral
principles, as there are, fram which tiUements derive.
'!bus, a requirement of ground
holds, and rights are generated from other
I1Dral principles, in particular those of
permission and obligation.
Rights are derivative not in the sense that there is a
precise recipe for translating rights discourse out-any adequate translation remains
within the rights circle of entiUement,
claims, etc.-but in the derivational sense
that they derive fran another part of the
deontic area, that arguments and justifications for them go back to deontic principles.

Because of

their
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tance in a It¥:>ral or environmental cause of
obtaining rights accreditation). Rights certainly have important protective and insurance roles, in sheltering items fran p::JWerful
actors and interests.
For those sorts of
persuasive reasons imputed rights are impor-

Feinberg's contention that "a right is a
protection of an interest, and hence [it is
claimed] for scmething to have a right it
must have an interest."
Nothing requires,
however, that the protection that rights
characteristically afford is of an interest;
as far as the meaning of "right" goes, it can
be of a thing or a system.
(4) Confusion.
Perhaps the It¥:>st notable
confusion Ihere is that of having a right with
exercising a right or even with being able to
claim a right.
'!hough these are evidently
different, and entailments fran having to
exercising or to claiming evidently fail,
such conflations are encouraged by easy but
unwarranted transitions, such as those fran
having a claim to making or being able to
make a claim. But, to reiterate, rights have
nothing highly intimate to do with the making
of claims by a holder (though no doubt an
articulate maker of claims holds sane advantage in achieving its and others' claims). A
creature or item with claims may have no
ability or oanpetence to make or present
them, or be the sort of thing that can.
(5) Contractions.
Here the issue is contracting rights to a subclass of rights, such
as exercisable rights, interest-protecting
rights, accountable rights, etc. '!hen indeed
conative requirements do follow (e.g., what
has an exercisable right llD.lSt presmnably at
sane stage be suitably alive and capable of
relevant activity) , but such requirements
follow fran the subclassification involved,
not fran the notion of right.
For instance,
the interest-protecting aspect of interestprotecting rights follows fran the interestprotecting restriction, not fran the notion
of rights, which may serve to protect things
lacking interests (especially tmder chauvinistically-favored high redefinitions of "interests").

tant in reinforcing principles, in getting
others to take items seriously, to treat them
decently, and so on. '!he social institutionalization of rights accordingly offers argumentative advantages not to be taken lightly
or abandoned.
For these sorts of reason,
too, rights are not superfluoUs.
Granted
that for many purposes we can proceed back to
the principles from which rights derive, it
is still not a consequence that we can get
along as well without them, still less that
there is no advantage or point to them.
A fourth set of consequences of the
rights package offered here is that there is
no basis for various restrictions widely
imposed upon the having of rights, such as
interests, sentience, etc.
Consider interests first, since an "interests" restriction
on rights-havers is pervasive. Nothing in the
definition and derivation scheme given requires interests (though they could be incorporated in suitability requirements).
Yet a
crucial premise in the issue of whether
things other than persons, animals especially, can have rights links rights-holding with
interests.
A typical bridge principle is
that only items which (can) have interests
have moral rights.
This principle is not
obvious and has had many rivals, notably with
"interests" replaced by other candidates put
up for gaining It¥:>ral standing, e.g., rationality, language, sentience, etc.--the same
tiresane list.

How then does the interest requirement
gain its wide accreditation and grip? For an
astonishing series of bad reasons, including:
(1) Usage. We don't speak of items lacking
interests (individuality, etc.) as possessing
rights.
In fact we do, and others have, and
non-usage has to be backed by other considerations i f arbitrariness and prejudice are to
be avoided.
(2) Abysmal analyses. A notable example is
Tooley's analysis of "X has a right to A" as
roughly synonYIt¥:>Us with "If X desires A, then
others are under a prima. facie obligation to
refrain fran actions that would deprive him
of it."
(3) Mistaken themes.
A notable example is

BE1'WEEN THE SPECIES

related cluster of points applies to
attempts to restrict rights to persons or to
individuals, attempts also typically tmderpinned by the assumption that what has or can
have rights llD.lSt have interests, or desires,
or a suitable conative life, or whatever.
But nothing in the notion of rights restricts
rights to persons, or to "persons" in a generous legaJ. sense. Nothing restricts them to
individuals, or individuals and "persons."
All these restrictions on right-holders are
imposed, without much or sufficient justification, usually for ideological reasons, such
as blocking legitimate claims on behalf of
damaged or disadvantaged items or systems
A
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expanding populations (thus too
are connected).

meriting protection.

Titlements to life and livelihood:
predatiqn, territoriality, and other
substantial problems

the

issues

Such natters as predation, territoriality, and population increase have been converted into serious problems by mistaken atanistic views of value and associated excessive
claims as to rights.
Removing these defective themes much reduces the problematic.
The value theory involved, typified by utilitarianism but an integral part of atcmistic
non-utilitarian positions such as Regan's,
holds that value (or utility) is a feature,
at bottcxn, of atcmistic items such as individuals, that those items (constituting the
base class) have a fixed (equal) value while
they persist, which is not substitutable for
or alienable, and that the (derived) values
of wholes and organized structures, such as
ecosystems, is simply an additive function of
the atoms within it. Characteristically also
themes of maximization and preservation of
present. values are incorporated into the
theory.
en such assumptions, predation and
the like involve a reduction in value, at
least in the shorter term, and so a suboptirral path, infringing maximization and preservation desiderata.
The rights view enhances
the problem by postulating a right to continued existence to every individual that has
initial (inherent) value (and similarly IIOral
considerability positions add to the difficulties) •
But the assumptions
involved
should be removed. Both the way the problems
are generated frcxn the assumptions and the
reasons for revising the value assumptions
are explained in detail elsewhere. [10] M:>st
important. ecosystems, which are IIOre than
the
sum of their individual canponents,
though they typically include predators, may
be highly valuable in their own right, with
lives of herbivores substituted for within
the system, without reduction of value. The
escalation of the problem through rights
theories deserves, however, SCIOO elaboration.

Despite the dust that status-quo-supporting philosophers have raised, there is no
doubt, looking through the cloud, but that
(a) animals have various interests, many of
them of the same sort as those of human
animals, for instance, sustenance, survival,
sex, and shelter. and (b) animals have various rights.
For example, they have, in the
same way that humans do, a right to live free
fran unnecessary suffering, and fran excessive interference.
While these claims are
substantially independent (having interests
is logically neither necessary nor sufficient
for having rights), there are nonetheless
significant connections, inasmuch as rights
serve to protect permissible worthwhile interests which IIOre pcMerful operators, such as
de-foresters, nay otherwise override or ignore.
There is no doubt, furthernore, that
present human practices systematically infringe animal rights, especially those tied
to their interests. For example, much animal
experimentation causes quite unnecessary suffering.
Thus, there is a powerful case for
changing these practices, a case both enhanced and easier to obtain positive action
upon by the due admission of relevant rights.
Attainment of the sorts of social protection
the widespread admission of rights can lead
to should not be underestimated in the way it
is by utilitarians and anti-noralists.
Granted animals have rights, sane of
them on a par with those that humans have, a
main outstanding question concerns
which
rights animals have.
Because especially of
the widespread phencmenon of predation, essential to the continued livelihood of many
creatures, the issue can look like an exceedingly difficult one (and one Regan canes to
grief upon).
There are undoubtedly serious
conflicts of interest induced through the
phenomenon, SCIOO of them unavoidable, as when
a herbivore's interest in continued existence
clashes with a carnivore's interest in continued sustenance, others avoidable, as in
human slaughter of whales and dolpuns. Predation is not, of course, the only source of
serious conflict of interests; territoriality, for instance, can also lead to serious
encounters, particularly in situaticms of

A serious clash of interests, as between
carnivores and herbivores, fortunately does
not thereby induce an incanpatibility of
rights, unless too many interests are elevated to rights.
But just this appears to
happen when the extensive (but not invariable) interests of living creatures in oontinuing to exist are sharply upgraded to unqualified rights to life (a mistaken elevation
that is eamon in ethical thought) •
The
right to life of a succession of gnus is
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A superior alternative, already indicated, consists in winding in excessive titlement concessions, so as to avoid extensive
conflict.
A strong and legitimate interest
in a continuing livelihood does not give an
unqualified right to life, which can be conferred against associated predators.
It
affords only a defeasible right, which can be
forfeited or lapse.
In these terms, a lion
that takes a weaker aged gnu, trailing or
separated fran a herd, does not violate its
defeasible right to life. The situation with
htnnans is not essentially different.
weak,
ill-equipped, or reckless htnnanS who put
themselves in or find themselves in threatening situations, such as high speed action or
wilderness travel, take their chances.
If
they thereby lose their lives, their defeasible right to life are not thereby infringed
(and where animals are involved, predatory
animals or animals defending their territories should not be persecuted).
Wild animals
such as gnus are alm:>st always on wilderness
travel, except when imprisoned in zoos; they
properly take their chances with natural
predators.

infringed by a lion which also has a right to
sustenance to sustain its life.
With the
. advance of teclmology it would llCM' be p:lssible to interfere in sane cases of predation,
e.g., that of the remaining large carnivores,
to uIflold gnu "rights" by switching the carnivores to an appropriate vegetarian diet
(and, to avoid culling, our splendid oontraceptive tecimology could be applied to hold
gnu p:lpulation in check).
But to deal with
all cases of predation and associated issues
in these bizarre sorts of ways is not only
practically impossible, such extensive interference with natural ecosystems is also itself at the very least dubiously permissible.
High-tech vegetarian-style resolutions
of
problems of predation, territoriality, and so
on, are radically unsatisfactory.
On the
contrary, virtually all remaining natural
systems containing large carnivores should be
left substantially intact or restored towards
their natural states. These ecosystems ought
to persist and have a right to though their
flourishing involves regular violation of
alleged absolute "rights to life."
Can't rights to life be left intact
(i.e., merely IWrally extended fran an inauthentic htnnan setting) , and the problems
skirted around? After all, sane conflict and
inconsistency even of rights, obligations,
and so on are inevitable and can be logically
lived with in these latter paraconsistent
days.
Sone can, but not too nuch. Conflict
should be confined to exceptional (often
significant) sorts of cases. In these tenus,
predation is not satisfactorily acccxrm::dated
by way of conflict of rights or principles.
It is too regular, systematic, and CWIlOl1place.
A sufficiently efficient deontic
system does not nultiply up conflict cases,
because they rem:>ve part of the p:lint of
deontic structures; for then nuch too nuch
t:ime is spent repuzzling and redeciding rather analogous conflict cases. A IWre satisfactory fashion to deal with such regular
systematic conflict, which undennines the
p:lint and force of principles, is revision of
principle. Furtherm:>re, a conflict of rights
approach doesn't feel at all right.
A lion
is not acting wrongly or infringing rights
wholesale when it kills an antelope or other
creature.

As pursuit of this approach suggests, a
helpful way of cc:ming to grips with predation
and like issues is through zoning or !lOre
generally through bioregionalisrn, which zones
regions of the earth's surface and elsewhere.
For what happens, what is protected, what is
permissible and right in wilderness can be
significantly different fran that in urban
areas.
A tiger that noves out of a wilderness to a supposedly easier life in a city
where incautious citizens are plentiful cannot expect and does not merit the same treatment as it did in the wilderness, namely
being left largely alone.
Moreover, with
bioregions it is nuch easier to think holistically, to see predation as an integral and
significant part of a rich natural structure
--rather than isolated action of individuals
without a further justifying setting.
(The
adjustment of ethical principles to regions
and large CCtllIIUI'li.ties need involve no loss of
universalizabilitYi "wilderness" is an appropriately general notion, not yet a proper

name. )
The action of carnivores
(including
traditional peoples) in wilderness areas, in
taking prey conservatively, in defending their

territories, and so on, involves in itself no
infringements of rights then, whether what is
BEIWEEN THE SPECIES
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The facts of satisization do not put
Nature out of step with IlOrality, with deontic principles.
For deontic principles also
answer back eventually to sufficient levels
of value, not to maximal consequences. Even
if it were best that value be maximized,
obligation certainly does not require it.
Predation can take a rightful place in such a
satisizing enviromnent, for the natural systems which have evolved with predation seem
to offer quite adequate, and often dazzling,
levels of value.

taken is human or not (is "replaceable" or
not) •
There is, IlOreover, no need to deny
that predation with its frequent violence and
death may involve loss of value as, for instance, if a carnivore had consumed a trespassing Darwin early in his career.
Only a
brash utilitarian would insist or pretend
that when all the undo-able canp1tations are
done, the suffering and losses and replacements of natural systems, net value of overall natural processes is always approximating
maximality. Q1 the other side, it would be a
supreme technological optimist who thought
that human-engineered systems could perfonn
nearly as satisfactorily, even on a quite
IlOdest scale. Human efforts, which are especially prone to breakdown, can saneti.mes make
sane small i.rrq;lrovements around the edges 1
IlOStly they rely upon exploiting what is
already there or nearby.
As a working rule,
the IlOre humans interfere with natural processes, the IlOre problems there are and the
more things go wrong.
Medical experience
with intexvention, even in matters as normally straightforward as human childbirth, provide well-docurnented evidence of the rule at
work. The chances of humans improving, technically or IlOrally, upon Nature in wilderness
areas is exceedingly slight. To adapt one of
the ecological "laws" to encapsulate the
working rule:
Nature generally does better
than humans.
Its corollary is:
Curtail
excessive human interference in natural regions.
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